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PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: THE NEED FOR A MORE DEFINITIVE
STANDARD OF FAIR REPRESENTATION WITHIN
THE VACA DOCTRINE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The protection of individual rights in the collective bargaining process
has recently been the subject of important litigation. In the context of
the national labor scheme, accommodation of the interests of the individual
employee involves the rather difficult task of reconciling the often conflicting interests of unions, management, society, and employees.' The
purpose of this Comment is to explore the alternative methods employed
by courts to protect individual employee interests in the administration
of collective bargaining agreements. Particular emphasis will be placed
on the "fair representation" doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Vaca v. Sipes.2 The starting point for this analysis is the hypothesis
that recognition of distinct classes of employees and grievances is a necessary prerequisite to the development of more adequate protective devices
for individual employee rights.
II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A.

The Vaca Decision

Although the suit in Vaca was against the union rather than the
employer, the majority discussed at length the problem of when a discharged employee can bring a breach of contract suit against his employer for wrongful discharge under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.4 The plaintiff in Vaca, a discharged union employee,
brought suit against the defendant union in state court alleging that
his discharge was in violation of the collective bargaining contract between his employer and union and that the union had "arbitrarily, capriciously, and without just cause" refused to submit his grievance to arbitration. The reason given by the union to justify the refusal was that
an examination by a union doctor, while the grievance was being processed
1. The interest of society may be generally defined as avoidance of industrial
strife; union interest is that of maintaining the power inherent in its role as exclusive
bargaining agent; the employer's interest is that of reducing the cost of handling
grievances by limiting the number of forums available to the individual; and the
individual's interest is, of course, redress for contract violations by the employer.
See generally Blumrosen, Group Interests in Labor Law, 13 RUrcERs L. REv. 432
(1958) ; Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. Rev. 601 (1956);
Comment, Individual Control Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77
YALE L.J. 559 (1968).
2. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
3. A very narrow reading of Vaca might lead to the conclusion that the Court's
discussion on the conditions for bringing a section 301 suit is dicta. However, both
the majority and Justice Black's dissent base most of their opinions on the contrary assumption.

4. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
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through the final stage of the grievance procedure, revealed that the
plaintiff was not fit to work."
On appeal, the Supreme Court found for the defendant union. Justice
White, speaking for a majority of five, held: (1) that the state court
had concurrent jurisdiction with the National Labor Relations Board
over the suit;6 (2) that as a matter of federal law, the evidence presented by the plaintiff did not establish a breach of the union's duty of
fair representation ;7 (3) that if in fact the plaintiff had stated a cause
of action against the union, the union could not be held liable for those
damages attributable solely to the employer's alleged wrongful discharge. 8
The Court further held that in order for an employee to bring a section
301 action against his employer, the employee, in the face of a defense
based on failure to exhaust his contractual remedies, must prove that
the union violated its duty of fair representation in its handling of the
employee's grievance.9 On the other hand, Justice Black, in dissent, proposed that the 'individual be given the opportunity to obtain redress
in court if at any time or for any reason, the union refused to further
process the grievance. 10
B.

The Employee's Causes of Action

The employee's right to sue his employer for breach of contract and
the duty imposed upon unions to use good faith in both the negotiation
and administration of collective agreements represent two fundamental
protective devices of the employee's rights.
5. There was conflicting medical evidence as to the fitness of the plaintiff. Prior
to the examination by the union physician, plaintiff was examined by his own personal
physician and was declared fit to work. An examination by a company doctor, upon
the plaintiff's return to work, resulted in a contrary diagnosis. 386 U.S. at 174-75.
6. Id. at 183.

In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the
Supreme Court held that when an activity is arguably subject to those sections of
the National Labor Relations Act which relate to employee rights (section 7) or
unfair labor provisions (section 8), the National Labor Relations Board was to have
exclusive jurisdiction. This "preemption" doctrine was justified on the basis of the
undesirability of judicial interference with national labor policy. Initially, the National
Labor Relations Board did not take jurisdiction of fair representation suits reasoning
that the basis of such suits was in section 9 rather than in sections 7 or 8 of the Act.
However, in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), the Board reversed its position holding that denial of
fair representation to an employee by his union violated section 8(b) (1) (A), 29
U.S.C. § 158, making it an unfair labor practice for unions to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. Thus, fair representation suits
came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board consistent with the rule in Garnon.
The Court in Vaca specifically declined to overrule the Board's decision in Miranda,
but seriously undercut the applicability of the preemption doctrine to fair representation cases when it concluded:
For these reasons, we cannot assume from the NLRB's tardy assumption of
jurisdiction in these cases that Congress, when it enacted N.L.R.A. § 8(b) in

1947, intended to oust the courts of their traditional jurisdiction to curb arbitrary

conduct by the individual employee's statutory representative.
386 U.S. at 183.
7. Id. at 193-95.
8. Id. at 197.
9. Id. at 186.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/6
10. Id. at 205-07.
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FairRepresentation

The doctrine of fair representation was judicially developed as a
counterbalance to the power possessed by the union selected by a majority
of employees within a bargaining unit to be their exclusive representative."
The content of the doctrine is framed in terms of a duty on the part of
the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit "to bargain fairly in

behalf of all the employees, union members and nonmembers, and without
hostile discrimination among them.' 1 2 In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 13
a case arising under the Railway Labor Act 1 4 and involving an abuse
of power by the designated exclusive representative of both white and
Negro employees, the Supreme Court held that the union violated its duty
of fair representation to Negro employees by negotiating a seniority agreement which gave preference to white foremen.1 5 On the same day the
Supreme Court held that the statutory duty of fair representation also
applied to bargaining representatives of unions covered by the National
Labor Relations Act. 16
The period following the Steele case witnessed an expansion of the
factual situations to which the duty of fair representation was applicable.' 7
Until 1957, it was not clear whether the duty of fair representation extended beyond the original negotiations between union and employer.
11. Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1 59(a)
(1964), provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment ....
12. Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. Rev. 151 (1957)

phasis added).
13. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
14. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-62 (1964).

(em-

For an exhaustive comparative analysis, see

Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation Under the Railway Labor and
National Labor Relations Acts, 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 167 (1968).

15. 323 U.S. at 199.
16. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944). The imposition of
the duty at first appeared to be limited to those bargaining agents who were certified
as representatives by the NLRB. Now it is clear that it also extends to those unions
who negotiate collective bargaining agreements "solely by virtue of [their] economic
strength or voluntary designation by all employees in the unit." Cox, supra note 12,
at 153.
17. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), the Supreme Court
clearly established the principle that a violation of a union's duty of fair representation
might occur in a non-racial context. Although the Court upheld preferential treatment
of veterans within the bargaining unit on the basis that it promoted public policy, it
implied that not all types of economic discrimination would stand up under the duty
of fair representation. In justifying the grant of credit for military service in determining seniority rights, the Court stated in pertinent part:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of any
negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The
mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete
satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range
of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving
the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of
purpose in the exercise of its discretion.

Id. at 338 (emphasis added). Though this power to place certain employees in a
detrimental position is limited to actions of good faith, its precise limits have not as
yetbybeen
Published
Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969
determined.
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The Supreme Court answered the question in Conley v. Gibson,1 8 a case
involving alleged racial discrimination in the processing of employee
grievances. In holding that the proscribed union discrimination does
not end with the negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, the
Court stated:
Collective bargaining is a continuing process ....

[I]t involves day-

to-day adjustments in the contract and other working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by existing agreements, and the
protection of employee rights already secured by contract. The bargaining representative can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying
out these functions than it can in negotiating a collective agreement. 19
From this analysis, it would appear that the duty of fair representation
now pervades the entire scope of employee-union relations as a check on
the abuse of power by unions.
2. Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements
The right of individual employees to bring fair representation suits
against their union has been firmly established; it is not clear, however,
under what conditions an employee can sue his employer for breach of
the employment contract. An indication of the extent to which individual
employees may challenge actions of employers concerning wages and
working conditions on the basis that these actions violate the employment contract may be obtained by examining the scope of section 301 (a)
of the Labor Management Relations Act. Section 301 (a) provides that
[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization . . . or between any such labor organizations, may be

brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 20
18. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
19. Id. at 46 (footnotes omitted). The Court further ruled that the fact that,
under the Railway Labor Act, aggrieved employees could file their own grievances
with the Adjustment Board or sue the employer for breach of contract was no justification for the union's discrimination in processing grievances. Id. at 47.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964). After the enactment of the Act in 1947, conflicting interpretations developed in lower federal courts as to the scope of section
301 (a). One interpretation of the statute held it to be merely jurisdictional in nature,
thus providing a federal forum for resolution of collective bargaining agreement
disputes applying state law. Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342
U.S. 237 (1952) ; Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil Workers, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir.
1951); Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers, 167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948).
The other interpretation saw the statute as creating substantive rights, thus authorizing the development of federal law to govern the resolution of conflicts under labor
contracts. Waialua Agr'l Co. v. United Sugar Workers, 114 F. Supp. 242 (D. Hawaii
1953) ; Textile Workers v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
The Supreme Court seemingly resolved this procedural-substantive controversy in
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437 (1955), holding that section 301 did not authorize the federal district courts
to entertain an action brought by a union on behalf of employees who claimed they
were denied a day's wages by their employer in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and that the scope of section 301 was merely jurisdictional. Two years

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/6
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On its face, the statute would appear to authorize only suits by labor
unions to enforce general provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The issue of whether suits against the employer by individual employees, or unions on their behalf, for redress of personal grievances is
within the scope of section 301(a) first came before the Supreme Court
in Association of Westinghouse SalariedEmployees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp.21 While the Court concluded that section 301 was jurisdictional
in nature, Justice Reed, in a concurring opinion, indicated that suits for
the purpose of vindicating uniquely personal rights (wages, seniority,
etc.) were not cognizable under section 301 (a) .22
The distinction made in Westinghouse between suits by unions to
vindicate the personal rights of employees and suits to enforce those
terms of the collective agreement running to the obligations of the union
(arbitration), with only the latter action being cognizable under section
301, was finally dissipated by the Court in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n.2 3
In that case, an employer violated a "no-discrimination" clause in the
collective bargaining agreement by allowing non-union employees to work
during a strike by members of one union, but not affording a similar
opportunity to members of a second union not on strike. After ruling
that the state court had jurisdiction over the case even though the conduct of the employer might arguably constitute an unfair labor practice,
and thus be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, 24 the Court continued:
The concept that all suits to vindicate individual employee rights
arising from a collective bargaining contract should be excluded from
the coverage of § 301 has thus not survived. .... 25 Individual claims
lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery, are to
a large degree inevitably intertwined with union interests and many
times precipitate grave questions concerning the interpretation and
enforceability of the collective bargaining contract on which they are
based. To exclude these claims from the ambit of § 301 would stultify
the congressional policy of having the administration of collective
bargaining contracts accomplished under a uniform body of federal
26
substantive law. This we are unwilling to do.
later, however, in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-58 (1957),
a case involving a union suit to compel arbitration, the Supreme Court reversed its
position as to the scope of section 301, holding that it authorized federal courts to
fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements,
and to include within that law specific performance of arbitration provisions contained
in the collective agreement.
21. 348 U.S. 437 (1955) ; see note 20 supra.
22. 348 U.S. at 464-65.
23. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
24. Id. at 197.
25. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962) (suit against
union and individual union members for violation of a no-strike clause contained in
the collective agreement) ; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960) (suit to recover wage increases in a contest over the validity
of the collective bargaining contract) ; General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, UEW, 353
U.S. 547 (1957) (suit to enforce an arbitrator's award ordering reinstatement and
back pay to employees).
26. 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962) (footnote added) (emphasis added).
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The Court further held that suits brought to enforce contractual rights
by individual employees, as opposed to those brought on their behalf
by the unions, should also be allowed under section 301 (a).27
Though Evening News established the right of an individual employee to sue under section 301, this right was not unqualified. The case
of Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox 28 involved a section 301 suit by an
employee in a state court for severance pay allegedly due under the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiff made no attempt
to use the three-step grievance procedure provided for in the agreement.
The general federal rule prior to Maddox required that an aggrieved employee must attempt to use established grievance procedure, unless the
employment contract stated differently, before pursuing his contractual
remedies in court under section 301.29 The plaintiff recovered, however,
on the theory that state law, which in this case did not require exhaustion
of contractual remedies, should be applicable, since, with the termination
of the employment contract, "no further danger of industrial strife exists
warranting the application of federal labor law. ' 'a0 In support of this
proposition, the plaintiff relied on a line of cases decided under the Railway Labor Act which expressly refused to hold that a discharged worker
must pursue collective bargaining grievance procedures before suing in
court for wrongful discharge. 81 The majority in Maddox, however, held
that the rationale of the cases decided under the Railway Labor Act
should not be carried over to a suit for severance pay on a contract
subject to section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act on
the grounds that allowing aggrieved employees to completely sidestep
grievance procedures would undermine the position of the union as his
exclusive representative and would deprive both union and employer of
a uniform method for orderly settlement of employee grievances.3 2 Thus,
the federal rule under the National Labor Relations Act prior to Maddox
was reaffirmed, and remains controlling today.
Viewed in the light of the judicial history of individual suits both to
enforce the bargaining agent's duty of fair representation and to enforce
compliance by the employer with terms of the collective agreement, the
impact of the decision in Vaca becomes more clear. Fair representation
and section 301 suits serve, when viewed separately, as practical protective
27. Id.
28. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).

29. Belk v. Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 315 F.2d 513 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 847 (1963) ; Cox, supra note 1, at 647-48.
30. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 651 (1968); see Slocum v.
Delaware, Lackawanna & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 244 (1950).
31. In Moore v. Illinois Central R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941), the Court held that
a trainman was not required to exhaust the administrative remedies under the Railway
Labor Act before suing in state court for wrongful discharge. This ruling was affirmed
in Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953).
It is important to note that even in light of the Maddox decision, the Court
has refused to overrule the Moore and Koppal cases. See Walker v. Southern Ry.,
385 U.S. 196 (1966).
32. 379 U.S. at 656-57.
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devices of individual employee rights. The Vaca formulation, however,
combines 3 3 them by conditioning the bringing of a section 301 suit, where
remedies have not been exhausted, upon proof of a breach by the bargaining agent of the duty of fair representation. Negative reaction to
the Vaca decision has been sharp and varied. Specifically, the rule pertaining to section 301 (a) suits has been criticized on the grounds that it
places too difficult a prerequisite on the employee, 34 that the rule would
be too difficult to administer judiciously,35 and that it places an unjustifiable limitation on the employee's right to bring a section 301 (a) suit.36
III.

FAIR REPRESENTATION -

WHAT

Is THE

STANDARD?

It is important to note that the Vaca court, from the point of view
of creating and defining the limits of a fair representation standard,
chose not to distinguish between what might constitute a breach of the
duty in the context of an employee suit against a union as opposed to an
employee section 301 suit against an employer. The failure of the Court
to make this distinction implied that the majority felt that the standard
should be the same for both situations.
The decision in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. 37 represents the first
judicial definition of a standard of fair representation in a racial context.
There the Supreme Court held:
We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory
representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally
the interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes
upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those
38
for whom it legislates.
33. This is not the first time that the duty of fair representation and a section 301

suit have been linked together. It was the opinion of the majority in Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), that a suit by individual employees against a union for
breach of the duty could properly be classified as a section 301 suit. This decision
provided a basis upon which to grant state courts jurisdiction over fair representation
suits since, previously, in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), the
Court held that federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction over section 301 suits even
though the actions of the employer constituted an unfair labor practice. Whether or
not the Humphrey characterization of fair representation suits as section 301 actions
will survive is open to question in light of the Vaca decision which met the preemption
problem squarely, giving state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction with the
National Labor Relations Board over fair representation suits without characterizing
them as section 301 actions.
34. See Comment, supra note 1, at 559.
35. Professor Wellington has characterized the defects in the Vaca formulation

in the following manner:
The Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes declined to choose between two routes contract or fair representation - for protecting the individual during contract
time. Rather, it preserved fair representation and individual suits under section
301. In so doing, however, it may have seriously undercut both. For while the
Court saw the relationship between the duty of fair representation and the section
301 action, it probably did not see clearly enough.
H.

LABOR AND TH
LEGAL PROCESS 178-79 (1968)
(emphasis added).
36. Justice Black in his dissent in Vaca argues: "I simply fail to see how it should

WELLINGTON,

make one iota of difference, as far as the 'unrelated breach of contract' by Swift is
concerned, whether the union's conduct is wrongful or rightful." 386 U.S. at 205.
See also Comment, supra note 1, at 578.
37. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
38. Id. atUniversity
202, Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969
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The Court specifically required that the union, during contract negotiation
''represent non-union or minority union members . . . without hostile
discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." 9 While the Court's
reference to the constitutional standards for equal protection has been
subject to conflicting interpretations, 40 it is clear that "hostile discrimination" was meant to be the definitive standard. In a racial discrimination
context, the standard would appear to be adequate to protect individual
rights, for classifications based on race are inherently unfair and easily
ascertainable.
The hostile discrimination standard, however, has not been limited
to cases involving racial discrimination. In Gainey v. Brotherhood of
Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 41 union employees brought a class action against both
the union and the railroad alleging failure to abide by an equalization
of pay clause in the collective bargaining agreement. In affirming the
district court's dismissal of an amended fair representation complaint
against the union, the Third Circuit stated:
In order to come within [the fair representation standard's]
ambit, the complaint before us must have more than conclusory statements alleging discrimination. In particular plaintiffs must make a
showing that the action or inaction of the statutory representative
complained of was motivated by bad faith, for the gravamen of the
rule is "hostile discrimination." An allegation that certain conduct
of the Brotherhood or a condition permitted to exist by it is "invidious" and "discriminatory", without a concomitant identification
of lack of good faith, will not42 set forth a claim sufficient to call for
the use of the Steele doctrine.
In order to make clearer its application of the "hostile discrimination"
standard, the court in Gainey listed three categories of factual situations
where a breach of fair representation would occur: (1) racial discrimination dealing with a patent disregard of job opportunities and seniority
rights of negro employees;43 (2) arbitrary sacrifice of a group of em39. Id. at 204.

40. One view of the Steele doctrine concludes that a labor union is an organ
compelled to act more like a legislator than an agent. For an excellent analysis of the
theory that the concepts of ordered liberty can be applied to union-management action
concerning employees, see Symposium - Individual Rights in Industrial Self-Government - A "State Action" Analysis, 63 Nw. U.L. Rgv. 4 (1968). Professor Wellington
takes a more conservative approach:
Steele does not hold that the equal protection clause of the Constitution applies
to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen. The equal protection
clause regulates state action - including, through the due process clause, the
actions of the United States itself. It would require some rather sophisticated
doctrinal analysis of the most far-reaching constitutional, and, therefore, fundamentally political, sort to equate Brotherhood action to state action. Perhaps the
equation is possible, but the Court was careful not to attempt it. The equal protection clause was employed as an analogy, not as a constitutional requirement.
H. WELLINGTON, supra note 35, at 148 (footnote omitted).
41. 313 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1963).
42. Id. at 323.
43. E.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Graham v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949) ; Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/6
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ployee's rights in favor of strong or more politically favored groups ;44
and (3) discriminatory measures taken against an individual for hostile
reasons. 45 In each category, bad faith is required to make the complaint
46
actionable.
An indication of the extent to which courts have upheld arbitrary
distinctions by unions among employees as long as the element of good
faith is present can be found in Union News Co. v. Hildreth.47 While this
case involved a suit by an employee against his employer for wrongful
discharge, the court, in judging the employer's actions, examined the
union's actions with respect to this employee applying in effect what
could be considered a fair representation standard. Specifically, the employee claimed that she was illegally discharged in violation of a "just
cause" provision in the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiff was one
of about a dozen employees at a lunch counter, the profits from which
were not meeting expectations, due apparently to mishandling of funds
and goods. The defendant employer suggested to the union that all the
employees be replaced. The union agreed to a temporary replacement
of five employees to become permanent if improvement was shown. Plaintiff, one of five employees permanently discharged, had a perfect 10-year
working record and it was not contended that the plaintiff mishandled
merchandise or money. The Sixth Circuit, reversing a judgment in the
trial court in favor of the plaintiff, held that the union had authority
based on good faith in the collective interest to agree with the employer
to discharge temporarily five employees merely on suspicion, and to make
the discharge permanent upon a showing of improvement in business
operations. 48 Since the union's action was clearly arbitrary with respect
to the plaintiff, it appears that the element of good faith is pervasive.
It is open to question whether the standards of fair representation
as enunciated in Steele, Gainey, and Union News were significantly
changed by the Vaca decision. The Court expressed the standard as follows: "A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only
when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining
unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. '49 One court has suggested that the use of the disjunctive "or" in the Vaca standard indicates
that the union's statutory duty is breached not only if there is a showing
of bad faith, but also, in the absence of bad faith, if the union's conduct
is shown to have been arbitrary or discriminatory. 50 Under this view,
44. E.g., Ferror v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961);
Mount v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Engrs, 226 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1955).
45. E.g., Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 266 F.2d 411, (2d Cir. 1959) ; Brady v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 360 (D. Del. 1959).
46. 313 F.2d at 324.
47. 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961). See also Simmons v. Union News Co., 341
F.2d 531 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 884 (1965), involving a suit on similar
grounds by a co-worker of Hildreth.

48. 295 F.2d 658, 664 (1961).

49. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) (emphasis added).
50. Zaleiko v. R.C.A., 67 L.R.R.M. 2259 (N.J. Super. 1967).
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it would appear that the agreement between the union and employer in
Union News would be struck down as arbitrary and discriminatory and
thus violative of the fair representation duty, even in the absence of
bad faith. Other courts have taken the point of view that the Steele
standard of hostile discrimination is still controlling in both a racial and
economic context. 5'
While decisions following Vaca do not reveal the difficulties predicted by some, 52 this is not indicative of the fact that the standard is
adequate. Even prior to the Vaca decision, the duty of fair representation, as a means of protecting individual employee rights, was criticized
on the ground that the standards applied could not reach subtle forms
of discrimination within the grievance procedure. 53 The courts, in an
effort to enhance the efficacy of the standard, have framed it in broad
terms, but in so doing have left it largely void of content.
IV. THE

ALTERNATIVES

The alleged deficiencies of the fair representation standard created
an impetus for development of alternative proposals for the protection
of individual rights under collective bargaining agreements. The proposals differ as to (1) the relative weight assigned to the interest of the
individual in both the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining contracts, (2) the forum for the adjudication of individual
rights, and (3) the emphasis placed on the type of grievances presented
in the administration of the contract.
In his dissenting opinion in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,54 Justice
Black proposed that the discharged employee have an absolute right to
bring a breach of contract action against his employer. In answer to
the argument that compliance with established grievance procedures is
necessary to effectuate the goals of national labor policy, Justice Black
states:
When a contract provided for arbitration to settle disputes
which affected many workers and which could lead to strikes, this
Court approved it and held that since both sides - company and
union - had agreed to this method of peaceful settlement, federal
law would honor and enforce it. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448. But to hold that the union and company can
bind themselves to arbitrate a dispute of general importance affecting all or many of the union's members and vitally threatening the
public welfare is a far cry from saying, as the Court does today,
that an ordinary laborer whose employer discharges him and then
fails to pay his past-due wages or wage substitutes must, if the
51. Dessingue v. S. Klein Dep't Stores, 66 L.R.R.M. 2569 (D. N.J. 1967);

Palmieri v. Steelworkers, 65 L.R.R.M. 2709 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
52. See, e.g.,

at 578.

WELLINGTON,

supra note 35, at 182-84; Comment, supra note 1,

53. Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37

N.Y.U.L. RZv. 362, 410 n.188 (1962).
54. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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union's contract with the employer provides for arbitration of grievances, have the doors of the courts of this country shut in his face
to prevent his suing the employer to get his own wages for breach
of contract. 55
Implicit in this view is the proposition that not all situations require
the subordination of the interests of the employee to those of national
labor policy. It is important to note that the Court in Vaca, as to when a
section 301 suit may be brought, did not make this distinction.
The polar alternative to Justice Black's position is represented in
the concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg in Humphrey v. Moore, 6
a case involving a challenge by an individual employee against modification of his seniority rights under the employment contract by joint
employer-union action. The majority held against the complaining employees, treating the suit as both one for breach of fair representation
and breach of the employment contract.5 7 The thrust of Justice Goldberg's opinion was to the effect that individual employees should never
be able to sue under section 301 for violation of the contract, for there
were "too many unforeseeable contingencies in a collective bargaining
relationship to justify making the words of the contract the exclusive
source of rights and duties."58 Thus, employees would be limited to fair
representation suits. It is clear that Justice Goldberg assumes that the
interests of the employer and union in maintaining a flexible employment
contract will always be of a higher order than that of the employees in
having the contract terms enforced. The approaches of Justices Black
and Goldberg are not concerned with fair representation, the former
finding an absolute right to sue the employer under section 301 and the
latter finding no such right under any circumstances.
The Supreme Court in Vaca declined to follow either of these approaches, taking an intermediate position. In light of the alternatives
discussed above, the Vaca rule appears to be the best approach. It is
clear that an unconditional right in the employee to sue his employer
would result in unjustifiable harassment of the employer. Moreover, taking from the employee any chance for redress would be equally as unsatisfactory, for the employer clearly owes contractual duties to the employee. By conditioning the right to sue under section 301 upon a breach
of fair representation, the Court implicitly recognized the need to balance
the competing interests of the employer, union, and employee. The medium
chosen for this balancing process was the duty of fair representation.
As was noted above, however, the standard is insufficiently defined and
is inadequate even where a suit is directed primarily at the union rather
than the employer by means of a section 301 suit. The problem therefore
becomes one of adding definitiveness to the standard. 59
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 663-64 (emphasis added).
375 U.S. 335 (1964).
Id. at 343-44.
Id.at 353-54.
H. WXLLINGTON, supra note 35, at 157.
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COMMENTS

EXPANDING THE STANDARD -

A

SITUATIONAL APPROACH

The distinction between negotiation and administration in collective
bargaining agreements provides a convenient conceptual tool through
which content may be added to the standard.60 In the negotiation stage
there is clearly a need for granting the exclusive representative almost
unlimited discretion, for the strength of the bargaining unit depends
almost entirely on presenting a uniform set of demands to the employer. 6 '
Thus, breaches of fair representation would occur only in cases of outright racial discrimination 62 or where there were clearly no valid grounds
for favoring one group in the unit over another in making economic distinctions. 63 In the administration of the collective bargaining agreement
through the grievance machinery, however, the individual interest, particularly where the complaint is from a single employee or a small group
of employees, should be considered primary. The competing interest of
avoiding industrial strife by giving the union a monopoly of power does
not carry much weight in the administration stage of the agreement, for
it is clear that in the usual case the settlement of a single employee grievance will not affect the pattern of industrial relations to any significant
degree. While the broad standards enunciated in Vaca and Steele may
provide adequate protection for individual rights in the negotiation of
collective agreements, they clearly are not adequate to protect what
should be the superior position of these rights in the administration
stage.
Another method of adding content to the fair representation standard
is to distinguish various types of grievances. One commentator has suggested that certain job interests are critical from the employee's point of
view and that judicial protection of these rights is a necessity. 4 Under
60. It has been suggested, both implicitly and explicitly, that the distinction
between negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements is not
completely valid since each decision under the grievance procedure has precedential
value for future determinations of like disputes under the contract, and is merely an
interpretation of the terms of the contract. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement,
69 HARV. L. Rev. 601, 625 (1956). This view has been criticized on two grounds:
(1) since the resolution of most grievances will turn only on factual issues, the
doctrine of precedent will not apply; (2) nothing can prevent the employer and union
from agreeing to eliminate the precedential value of all points of law decided in all
grievances not processed by the union. Comment, Individual Control Over Personal
Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559, 563-64 (1968). It is submitted
that the distinction is valid at least for the purpose of demonstrating the need for
an expanded concept of fair representation in the administration of grievances under
collective bargaining agreements.
61. In J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944), the Court held that a
collective bargaining agreement between union and employer superseded prior valid
contracts between the employer and the employee, even where these terms were more
favorable to the employees in question. The decision is indicative of the extent to
which the Court has attempted to give exclusive control to the union over contract negotiations.
62. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
63. Where, for instance, wage differentials are large between union and non-union
members of the same unit for jobs requiring similar skills.
64. Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management
Autonomy Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTrRs L. Rlv. 631 (1959).
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this view, where the dispute involves discharge, 5 compensation, or
seniority, and a union refuses to process the grievance, the employee would
have the right, if his claim has merit, to obtain a court order compelling
arbitration. Although it is open to question whether, from the employee's
point of view," arbitration is a more favorable method of redress than
a court suit for damages, the proposal has merit in its recognition that
the degree to which the individual interest is protected should depend
on the job interest involved. Distinctions in job interests could easily
be infused in the fair representation standard. Thus, courts, in determining whether a union has breached its duty of fair representation, could
hold the union to a higher standard where it refused to process a grievance
involving a critical job interest than in the case where the complaint is
based merely on a change in job station. In addition, it would not appear that the employer's interests increase commensurately with the type
of grievance presented. Therefore, by holding the union to a higher
standard of fair representation, the court would merely be realigning
the balance among individual, employer, and union interests to reflect the
importance of the grievance presented.
The membership status of an employee might also be a convenient
guideline along which to expand the content of the fair representation
standard. Since the duty of fair representation extends to all members
of a bargaining unit, situations will arise where minority union and nonunion members of the bargaining unit will present grievances to the
majority representative for processing. A refusal to present these grievances may merely be the result of a discriminatory attitude on the part
of the majority union. The practical possibility of such a result should
be reflected by shifting to the union the burden of showing that a breach
of the duty has not occurred. The necessity of varying the burden of
proof to account for the type of grievance presented as well as the party
presenting it becomes clear in face of the rule in Vaca which precludes
recovery from either the union or employer for failure to prove a breach
of the standard.
65. The need for a higher standard of fair representation is particularly evident
in the case of the discharged employee. His absence from the work area seriously
undercuts his ability to persuade union representatives to process his grievances
through higher stages.
66. In his dissenting opinion in Maddox, Justice Black compared the relative
merits of arbitration and the court as forums for the adjustment of grievances:
For the individual, whether his case is settled by a professional arbitrator or
tried by a jury can make a crucial difference. Arbitration differs from judicial
proceedings in many ways: arbitration carries no right to jury trial as guaranteed
by the Seventh Amendment; arbitrators need not be instructed in the law; they
are not bound by rules of evidence; they need not give reasons for their awards;
witnesses need not be sworn; the record or proceedings need not be complete;
and judicial review, it has been held, is extremely limited. To say that because
the union chose a contract providing for grievance arbitration an individual
employee freely and willingly chose this method of settling any contractual claims
of his own which might later arise is surely a transparent and cruel fiction.
379 U.S. 650, 664-65 (1965). For a proarbitration viewpoint, see Summers, supra
note 53.
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COMMENTS
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EXPANDED STANDARD

-

THE PROPER FORUM

Having reviewed the guidelines along which the standard may be
expanded, the question of the proper forum to implement the standard
arises. In holding that the National Labor Relations Board did not have
exclusive jurisdiction over fair representation suits, the Vaca Court discussed the relative merits of a judicial as opposed to an administrative
forum:
A primary justification for the pre-emption doctrine - the
need to avoid conflicting rules of substantive law in the labor relations area and the desirability of leaving the development of such
rules to the administrative agency created by Congress for that purpose - is not applicable to cases involving alleged breaches of the
union's duty of fair representation. The doctrine was judicially developed in Steele and its progeny, and suits alleging breach of the
duty remained judicially cognizable long after the NLRB was given
unfair labor practice jurisdiction over union activities by the L.M.R.A.
... [I] t can be doubted whether the Board brings substantially greater
expertise to bear on these problems than do the courts,6 7which have
engaged in this type of review since the Steele decision.
The Court also pointed to the fact that if exclusive jurisdiction was placed
in the National Labor Relations Board, the individual employee might
be denied assurance of an impartial review of his complaint, since the
Board's General Counsel has unreviewable discretion to institute an unfair
68
labor practice complaint.
Although the Court's position has been challenged on the grounds
that state judges do not possess the necessary expertise to decide fair
representation cases and that concurrent jurisdiction will result in a lack
of uniformity in the application of the fair representation standard, 69
the judicial forum is probably best able to implement an expanded duty
of fair representation. Merely by shifting the burdens of persuasion and
proof as previously pointed out, the courts may effect significant changes
in the standard. Where, for instance, a non-union employee is attempting
to bring a section 301 suit against his employer for wrongful discharge,
the initial burden of persuasion should be placed on the union to show
that a breach of fair representation has not occurred. Conversely, where
a union employee brings suit against his union for an alleged breach of
duty in agreeing to a certain contract clause during negotiation of the
contract, the burden of proving a breach of fair representation would
properly remain with the employee.
67. 386 U.S. at 180-81 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 182.

69. H. W4LLINGTON, supra note 35, at 173.
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CONCLUSION

Enforcement of the duty of fair representation is only one of several
methods of protecting individual rights under collective agreements. Now
that the right to a second remedy, individual employee suits against
employers for breach of the employment contract, has been conditioned
upon a showing of the breach of the duty, it is advisable that the present
standards of fair representation be expanded to reflect the multidimensional interests of the individual employee. While the use of the present
broad and vague standard, coupled with an undimensional approach to
the problem of individual rights, has not resulted in injustice in all cases,
this should not be considered indicative of the fact that the standard is
adequate or that improvement is not necessary.

David I. Griffith
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